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Abstract: We consider graphical games as introduced by Kearns et al. (2001). First we analyse
the interaction of graphicality with a notion of strategic equivalence of games, providing a
minimal complexity graphical description for games. Then we study the interplay between
graphicality and the classical decomposition of games proposed by Candogan et al. (2011),
characterizing the graphical properties of each part of the decomposition.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Graphical games, which were first introduced in Kearns
et al. (2001), are games equipped with a network structure
among players that specifies the pattern of dependence
of their utilities. More precisely, in a graphical game the
utility of a player is made to depend only on her own action
and the action of her out-neighbour players. They have
recently become prominent as a unifying theory to study
the emergence of global phenomena in socio-economic net-
works like peer effects, technology adoption, and consensus
formation (Jackson and Zenou (2015)). They are also a
natural model in engineering and computer science to
describe the interactions in multi-agent systems and a
powerful tool to design distributed algorithms (Daskalakis
and Papadimitriou (2006)).
While there is already a large amount of literature focusing
on specific graphical games (e.g. coordination and anti-
coordination games), it is still missing a general theory.
How the graphicality of a game reflects on its properties
is still largely unexplored. A remarkable exception is
constituted by the paper by Babichenko and Tamuz (2016)
where authors prove that a potential graphical game
admits a potential reflecting the graphical structure, that
can be decomposed as a sum of terms defined on the cliques
of the graph. For non potential games, at the best of our
knowledge, there is no such general analysis.
In this paper we focus on a concept of strategic equivalence
for games and on a classical decomposition of games
in terms of non-strategic, potential and harmonic parts
introduced in Candogan et al. (2011). An analysis of
some strategical aspects of such decomposition has been
carried out in Abdou et al. (2019) where authors point
out some drawback of it and propose a generalization to
overcome those issues. In our work, instead, we undertake
a fundamental analysis on how such concepts interact with
the graphicality of a game.
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In many contexts, it is natural to consider games up to
strategic equivalence, meaning that we are only concerned
with variations of the utility of a player when she modifies
her action rather then their absolute values. This is typical
in technological contexts where the game is the result of
an explicit design rather then an intrinsic model. Classical
evolutionary dynamics associated to games like the best-
response dynamics or the log-likelihood dynamics are
invariant with respect to this equivalence. Our first result,
Corollary 2, determines the minimal graph with respect
to which a game is graphical up to strategic equivalence.
It is a sort of minimal complexity result showing that
certain interactions in the game are fictitious and can
consequently be removed.
Our main results regard the way the decomposition reflects
the graphicality of a game. While the non-strategic part
is always graphical with respect to the same graph than
the original game, the same is not true in general for the
potential and harmonic parts that are instead graphical
with respect to a larger graph where out-neighbourhoods
have become cliques. Intuitively, this means that there are
short range hidden strategic interactions which involve
only players that directly influence the utility of some
common player in G. This is the content of our main
result, Theorem 4. This “interaction enlargement” not
always happens and we show that for the important class
of pairwise-separable graphical games (where utility of
players is the sum of utilities of 2-players games played
with their neighbours) actually the potential and harmonic
components maintain the original graphicality on G. We
present an explicit example where this phenomenon shows
up.
2. GRAPHICAL GAMES AND STRATEGIC
EQUIVALENCE
2.1 Graph-theoretic notation
A (directed) graph G = (V, E) is the pair of a finite node
set V and a link set E ⊆ V × V, whereby a link (i, j) ∈ E
is meant as directed from its tail node i to its head node
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j. We shall assume that the graph G contains no selfloops,
i.e., that (i, i) /∈ E for every i ∈ V and we shall denote
by Ni = {j ∈ V : (i, j) ∈ E} and N •i = Ni ∪ {i}
the open and, respectively, closed out-neighbourhoods of
a node i in G. The intersection of two graphs G1 = (V, E1)
and G2 = (V, E2) is the graph G1 ∩ G2 = (V, E) where
E = E1∩E2. Note that we shall consider undirected graphs
as a special case where (i, j) ∈ E if and only of (j, i) ∈ E .
We shall often consider certain supergraphs of a graph
G = (V, E), all undirected and obtained by keeping the
same node set V and augmenting the link set E as follows.
First, let G↔ = (V, E↔) where
E↔ = E ∪ {(j, i) : (i, j) ∈ E}
be the graph obtained by making all links in G undirected.
On the other hand, let G4 = (V, E4) be the graph whose
link set E4 is obtained from E by adding links among all
pair of outneighbours of every node, i.e.,
E4 = E↔ ∪
⋃
i∈V
{(j, l) : j 6= l ∈ Ni} .
In fact, we shall consider a more general notion of exten-
sion of a graph G = (V, E) defined as follows. Consider a
covering
Ni =
ki⋃
h=1
Shi (1)
of the open neighbourhood of each node i ∈ V. We denote
the array of such coverings as S = {Shi }i∈V,1≤h≤ki , and we
call S a splitting of G. Then, define the graph GS = (V, ES)
with the same node set as G and link set
ES = E↔ ∪
⋃
i∈V
ki⋃
h=1
{
(j, l) : j 6= l ∈ Shi
}
.
Observe that G↔ and G4 are special cases of GS when, for
every node i ∈ V, ki = |Ni| and Shi are all singletons, and
respectively, when ki = 1 and S1i = Ni.
2.2 Graphical games
Throughout the paper, we shall consider strategic form
games with a finite set of players V, where each player
i ∈ V has finite action set Ai. We shall denote by X =∏
i∈V Ai the space of all players’ strategy profiles. For a
player i ∈ V, let X−i =
∏
j∈V\{i}Aj be the set of strategy
profiles of all players except for i. As customary, for a
strategy profile x ∈ X , the strategy profile of all players
except for i is denoted by x−i ∈ X−i. When two strategy
profiles x, y ∈ X coincide except for possibly in their i-th
entry, i.e., when x−i = y−i, we shall say that x and y are
i-comparable and we shall write x ∼i y.
Let each player i ∈ V be equipped with a utility function
ui : X → R. We shall identify a game with player set V
and strategy profile space X with the vector u assembling
all the players’ utilities. Notice that, in this way, the set
of all games with player set V and strategy profile space
X , to be denoted by Γ, is isomorphic to the vector space
RV×X .
Graphical games (Kearns et al. (2001)) are defined im-
posing suitable restrictions on the way utilities depend on
strategies. Precisely, a game u is said to be graphical on
a graph G = (V, E) (or, briefly, a G-game) if the utility of
each player i ∈ V depends only on her own action and the
actions of fellow players in her neighbourhood in G, i.e., if
ui(x) = ui(y) , ∀x, y ∈ X s.t. xNi = yNi . (2)
Notice that if a game u is graphical with respect to two
graphs G1 = (V, E1) and G2 = (V, E2), it is also graphical
with respect to G1 ∩ G2. Considering that every game u
is trivially graphical on the complete graph on V, we can
conclude that to each game u ∈ Γ one can always associate
the smallest graph on which u is graphical. We shall refer
to such graph as the minimal graph of the game u and
denote it as Gu.
A special case of graphical games are the pairwise-
separable graphical games (cf. Daskalakis and Papadim-
itriou (2009); Cai and Daskalakis (2011)) whereby, for a
given graph G = (V, E), the utility of player i ∈ V is in the
form
ui(x) =
∑
j∈Ni
uij(xi, xj) ∀x ∈ X , (3)
where uij : Ai × Aj → R for i, j ∈ E . Notice that the
utilities in (3) clearly define a G-game. In fact, such a
game can be interpreted as one in which the players are
located at the nodes of G whose links are to be interpreted
as two-player games between their endpoints (with the
convention that uji(xj , xi) = 0 for every (j, i) /∈ E such
that (i, j) ∈ E). Every player i ∈ V can chose a unique
action xi ∈ Ai to be used in all games she simultaneously
participates in and gets a utility that is the aggregate of
the utilities from all her outgoing links.
Every graphical game possesses some separability proper-
ties, pairwise separability being the finest possible case. It
is then useful to treat in a unified way all graphical games
by introducing the notion of S-separability. More precisely,
given a G-game u and a splitting S = {Shi }i∈V,1≤h≤ki ofG, we say that the game u is S-separable if for every player
i ∈ V the utility function can be decomposed as
ui = u
0
i +
ki∑
h=1
uhi , (4)
where u0i depends only on the actions of players in Ni, i.e.,
u0i (x) = u
0
i (y) if xNi = yNi and each term u
h
i depends only
on the action of i itself and of players in Shi , i.e., u
h
i (x) =
uhi (y) if xi = yi and xShi = yShi . Separable graphical games
are an extension of pairwise-separable graphical games,
where we consider that players have separate interactions
with different groups of their neighbours. Such partition
of their neighbourhoods is described by the splitting S.
2.3 Strategic equivalence and graphicality
A game u is referred to as non-strategic if the utility of
each player i ∈ V does not depend on her own action, i.e.,
if
ui(x) = ui(y) , ∀x, y ∈ X s.t. y ∼i x . (5)
The set of non-strategic games will be denoted by N . Two
games u and u˜ are referred to as strategically equivalent if
their difference is a non-strategic game, i.e., if
ui(x)−u˜i(x) = ui(y)−u˜i(y) , ∀x, y ∈ X s.t. y ∼i x . (6)
Strategic equivalence is in fact an equivalence relation on
games and we shall denote the strategic equivalence class
of a game u by [u]. It follows from the definition that
strategically equivalent games are separable with respect
to the same splittings.
A game u is referred to as normalized if∑
y∼ix
ui(y) = 0 , ∀x ∈ X , i ∈ V . (7)
For a game u, one can define its normalized version as the
game u with utilities
ui(x) = ui(x)− 1|X−i|
∑
y∼ix
ui(y) , ∀x ∈ X , i ∈ V . (8)
It is then easily verified that the game u is both normalized
and strategically equivalent to u. In fact, u is the unique
normalized game in the class [u] (Candogan et al., 2011,
Lemma 4.6.).
Two strategically equivalent games u and u˜ might have
quite different minimal graphs Gu and Gu˜. Indeed, it is easy
to see that every game u admits a strategically equivalent
game u˜ such that Gu˜ is the complete graph. It is then
less obvious that a strategic equivalence class [u] always
contains a game whose minimal graph is contained in the
minimal graph of every other game u˜ in [u]. This property
turns out to hold true, as a consequence of the following
result.
Proposition 1. Let u be a game, u its normalized version.
Then,
Gu ⊆ Gu . (9)
The following is a direct consequence of Proposition 1 and
of the fact that the normalized version of any strategically
equivalent game u˜ ∈ [u] coincides with the normalized
version u of u.
Corollary 2. Let u be a game, u its normalized version.
Then,
Gu ⊆ Gu˜ . (10)
for every strategically equivalent game u˜ ∈ [u].
Corollary 2 implies that there exists a game in [u] that is
graphical on the intersection
G[u] =
⋂
u˜∈[u]
Gu˜
of the minimal graphs of all the strategically equivalent
games [u]. In fact, the graph
G[u] = Gu
may be interpreted as the minimal topological complexity
needed to represent a game in the class [u], namely a game
up to non-strategic equivalence.
3. DECOMPOSITION OF GRAPHICAL GAMES
We now introduce the two classes of potential games (Mon-
derer and Shapley (1996)) and harmonic games (Candogan
et al. (2011)). A game u ∈ Γ is as an (exact) potential game
if there exists a function φ : X → R such that
ui(x)−ui(y) = φ(x)−φ(y) , ∀i ∈ V , ∀x ∼i y ∈ X , (11)
while u ∈ Γ is an harmonic game if∑
i∈V
∑
y∼ix
[ui(x)− ui(y)] = 0 , ∀x ∈ X . (12)
Notice that a normalized game is harmonic if and only if∑
i∈V
|Ai|ui(x) = 0 , ∀x ∈ X . (13)
Hence, in particular, if the action sets of all players have
the same cardinality |Ai| = a, then a normalized game u
is harmonic if and only if it is a 0-sum game, i.e.,∑
i∈V
ui(x) = 0 , ∀x ∈ X . (14)
Babichenko and Tamuz (2016) showed that the potential
of a potential G-game possesses a special structure that
reflects the one of the underlying graph G. Corollary 2
allows us to improve such result by refining the decompo-
sition proposed therein. Indeed, all strategically equivalent
games to a potential game u are still potential with the
same potential function. So the graphical structure of the
potential is determined by the smallest graph G[u].
Corollary 3. Let u be a potential G-game with potential
φ. Then φ can be decomposed as
φ(x) =
∑
C∈C(G[u])
φC(xC) (15)
for some functions φC : Πi∈CAi → R called local potentials
and where C(G[u]) is the set of maximal cliques of G[u].
It has been proven in (Candogan et al., 2011, Theorem
4.1.) that the space of games can be decomposed as a
direct sum P⊕N ⊕H, where P is the space of normalized
potential games, N is the space of non-strategic games,
H is the space of normalized harmonic games. We are
interested in characterizing graphicality properties of such
decomposition. In particular, our main result, stated as
Theorem 4 below, provides a generalization and refinement
of the one in Candogan et al. (2011).
Theorem 4. A finite game u ∈ Γ is S-separable if and only
if it can be decomposed as
u = uN + uP + uH ,
where
• uN is a non-strategic Gu-game;
• uP is a normalized S-separable potential GS[u]-game;
• uH is a normalized S-separable harmonic GS[u]-game.
Here we state a few direct consequences of Theorem 4.
First, recall that, for every splitting S of G[u], we have
that GS[u] ⊆ G4[u], so that Theorem 4 directly implies the
following.
Corollary 5. Every finite game u ∈ Γ can be decomposed
as
u = uN + uP + uH ,
where
• uN is a non-strategic Gu-game;
• uP is a normalized potential G4[u]-game;
• uH is a normalized harmonic G4[u]-game.
Corollary 5 implies that GuP and GuH are subgraphs of
G4[u]. So, in general, the decomposition does not preserve
graphicality, but in the graphs describing the interactions
among players in the potential and harmonic component
of a game u there may be a direct influence only among
players which belong to a common out-neighbourhood
in G[u]. Comparing Theorem 4 and Corollary 5 we see
that the separated dependence of utility functions on
Fig. 1. Interaction graph G for example 3.1.
Fig. 2. Minimal graphs associated to the potential (left)
and harmonic (right) component of the game in
example 3.1 (up to strategic equivalence)
neighbours allows to exclude the presence in the potential
and harmonic component of direct interactions between
players belonging to different groups. In fact, often the
graph GS[u] is much smaller than G4[u]. In particular, for
the special case of pairwise-separable graphical games,
Theorem 4 implies the following result.
Corollary 6. Let u ∈ Γ be a pairwise-separable graphical
game on a graph G = (V, E), with utilities as in (3). Then,
u = uN + uP + uH where
• uN is a non-strategic G-game;
• uP is a pairwise-separable normalized potential G↔-
game;
• uH is a pairwise-separable normalized harmonic G↔-
game.
This result shows that for pairwise-separable graphical
games the decomposition in potential and harmonic part
preserves the original graphical structure as it does not
create any link between players that were not directly
interacting in the original game.
3.1 Example
As an example of the results, consider the following G-
game. Eight players connected through the graph G as in
Figure 1 decide of acquiring (action 1) or not acquiring
(action 0) some good. All players but one are assumed
to have an imitative behaviour, in that they just benefit
from taking the same action as the majority of their
neighbours. Accordingly, they play a majority game, with
utility functions
ui(x) = |{j ∈ Ni : xj = xi}| i = 2, . . . , 8 .
Player 1 plays a so called “public good game”,
u1(x) = 1− c if x1 = 1
u1(x) = 1 if x1 = 0, xj = 1 for some j ∈ N(1)
u1(x) = 0 if x1 = 0, xj = 0 for all j ∈ N(1) ,
i.e., she prefers to borrow the good from some of her
neighbours rather than buying it and paying the cost c.
Figure 2 shows the minimal graphs associated to the po-
tential and harmonic components of the game. According
to the theorem, they are subgraphs of G4 and in this
case they are proper subgraphs. Actually we see some
additional feature of the decomposition. The game is not
potential but is indeed a local perturbation of a potential
game, the majority game: the locality of the perturbation
is preserved by the decomposition. Indeed, we see that
players which are far from the perturbation are only linked
in the graph of the potential component and that the only
additional edges with respect to G are between neighbours
of player 1.
4. CONCLUSION
We analysed the interaction between graphicality and
strategic equivalence, proving the remarkable fact that
there exists a minimal graph associated to a game up to
strategic equivalence. The core of our analysis has been
the understanding of the interplay between graphicality
and decomposition, yielding our major result which shows
that the potential and harmonic components of a game u
are graphical games with respect to the undirected graph
G4[u]. Current work includes the interpretation of the role of
hidden strategic interactions and the application of these
techniques to the theory of Markov Random Fields (in
the spirit of Babichenko and Tamuz (2016)) and as a tool
for studying Nash equilibria of perturbations of potential
games.
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